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and the possibility of ethics
Steph GROHMANN, School of Anthropology and Museum Ethnography,
University of Oxford and Centre for Homeless and Inclusion Health,
University of EdinburghAnthropologists working on ethics have emphasized the importance of freedom for the becoming of ethical subjects. While
some have therefore aligned themselves with the later work of Foucault, his earlier work has been identiﬁed as part of a “science
of unfreedom” antithetical to the study of ethics. In this article, I suggest that the “early Foucault” can nevertheless be relevant
for the anthropology of ethics, speciﬁcally by looking at contexts where freedom is not a given, but has to be actively created through
the overcoming of conditions of unfreedom. Drawing on Faubion’s discussion of ethical subject positions, as well as Foucault’s work
on disciplinary architectures, I discuss how subject positions, ethical and otherwise, are also and especially produced through prac-
tices of ordering material and symbolic space. Different socio-spatial orders can therefore either be designed to impede the ﬂour-
ishing of free ethical subjects, or to facilitate it.
Keywords: ethics, subject position, space and place, territoriality, squatting, homelessnessIntroduction
Anthropology’s recent “ethical turn” has seen a revival
of interest in questions of morality and ethics. Within
the fast-growing literature on the ethical dimension of
human life, a number of approaches have emerged, con-
cerning themselves with the embeddedness of ethics in
everyday life (Lambek 2010; Das 2015), with extraordi-
narymoments of ethical crisis (Zigon 2007; Faubion 2011),
the experiential dimension of the ethical (Csordas 1990,
1993, 1994, 1999, 2008; Desjarlais and Throop 2011),
moral reasoning (Sykes 2012), andmoral narratives (Mat-
tingly 1998, 2010; Faubion 2001; Zigon 2012), to name
just a few. While it is impossible to do justice to all these
contributions in this article, I will draw speciﬁcally on a
set of approaches that galvanize around the notion of the
ethical subject, and the various ways that individuals cul-
tivate the kind of self they associate with ideas of “the
good” (Laidlaw 2002, 2013; Widlok 2004; Hirschkind
2006; Lambek 2008; Mahmood 2011; Mattingly 2012).
As Laidlaw relates, a number of anthropologists work-
ing in this vein have found the “neo-Aristotelian” ap-
proach exempliﬁed in the work of Michel Foucault par-heory. Volume 8, number 3. DOI: http://dx.doi.
Theory. All rights reserved. 2575-1433/2018/080
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se subject to University of Chicago Press Terms ticularly ingenious to their efforts (e.g., in different ways,
Hirschkind 2006; Zigon 2007; Mahmood 2011; Mattingly
2012), as it speciﬁcally speaks to the notion of ethical be-
coming as a “technology of the self.” One of the most
prominent examples of such work in recent years is cer-
tainly James Faubion’s An anthropology of ethics (2011).
In a decisive development of Foucauldian ethics, Fau-
bion argues that becoming an ethical subject is not only
a matter of cultivating particular virtues or dispositions,
but also involves actors gradually aligning themselves
with particular “ethically marked subject positions” (2011:
14), i.e. becoming occupants of predeﬁned standpoints
within a given network of symbolic relationships. “Eth-
ical autopoiesis,” in this view, is therefore to a degree cir-
cumscribed by the availability of such socially produced
subject positions to the individual, thus situating indi-
vidual freedom within an “encompassing web” (Robbins
2012) of social relations.
In this article, I would like to take up the notion of
subject “positions” in what is perhaps a more literal sense
than the one Faubion has in mind: I want to talk about
the ways that (ethical) subjects are produced by position-
ing bodies in material and symbolic space. I will draw onorg/10.1086/701113
3-0011$10.00
.019.038 on January 21, 2019 08:00:18 AM
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507 MAKING SPACE FOR FREE SUBJECTSethnographic data taken from my research with home-
less people and squatters, conducted between 2010 and
2012 in Bristol, England, to illustrate this argument.
The limitations of format do not allow me to provide
a comprehensive introduction to my ﬁeld site here,
for which I therefore have to refer the reader to my
forthcoming book. However, to brieﬂy contextualize, my
ﬁeldwork was conducted around the time that squat-
ting in England was turned from a civil dispute into a
criminal offence. Before this change in law in 2012, squat-
ting had, for practical purposes, been considered “legal,”
and the ongoing housing crisis across England, in con-
cert with post-2008 austerity, meant that for thousands
of people, squatting was a last-resort measure to alleviate
pressing housing need. My ﬁeld site at the time harbored
a lively community of several hundred squatters, con-
nected in an ever-shifting network of dwellings, vehicle
sites, and social spaces, which speciﬁcally understood
itself as a self-help network for homeless and precari-
ously housed people. As squatters viewed it, squatting
was a remedy for homelessness in the simple sense that
as soon as a homeless person took possession of a squat,
they were no longer homeless, and thus, passively at the
mercy of the elements as much as their fellow man. In-
stead, they became “a squatter,” that is to say, a person
who by virtue of actively taking occupation of a space had
deliberately taken on a new social identity and position.
“A squatter,” in this view, was therefore not simply an-
other variety of homeless person (as the responsible so-
cial services would have it), they were an entirely different
breed: someone who through deliberately resisting their
exclusion from shelter had turned themselves not just
into a dweller, but effectively, a rebel. This transformation
of homeless people into squatters was inexorably tied up
with their physical occupation of the space of the squat,
and therefore aptly serves to illustrate how assuming a
particular spatial position can, quite literally, translate
into assuming a particular subject position.
Faubion’s understanding of the term “subject posi-
tion” certainly goes beyond such a “geographical” inter-
pretation. At the same time, however, one also does not
have to stray too far from Foucault’s work on ethics to
ﬁnd a well-known example of what I mean by this. Be-
fore turning his attention to what he calls “power rela-
tions” between free subjects, Foucault devoted a great
part of his work to thinking about their opposite, namely
relations of domination and the various discourses and
practices that subjugate the embodied self. A special role
in these processes of subjugation falls to what has comeThis content downloaded from 129.215
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms to be widely known as “disciplinary architectures” (Fou-
cault 2012) i.e. socio-spatial arrangements that are de-
signed to produce particular kinds of subjectivities and
social relations. Foucault argues that such architectures,
found for example in prisons, hospitals, barracks, etc.,
act as technologies of power, epitomized in an emblem-
atic example that has become the namesake for loci of
discipline as such: the Panopticon. The concept is so well
known that it hardly requires much of an explanation:
a Panopticon, as originally devised by Jeremy Bentham,
is a type of architectural arrangement which distributes
bodies in space in such a way that they become subject
to constant and unbroken surveillance. It therefore pro-
duces, by virtue of its spatial properties, a range of lit-
eral and ﬁgurative subject positions within a disciplin-
ary discourse comprised of brick-and-mortar as much
as of language and practice. For the interned, occupancy
of both the architecture and the discursive subject posi-
tions it imposes is quite clearly a matter of coercion rather
than choice—their behavior options are starkly restricted
and scripted through the relation to the other imposed
by the spatial properties of the inhabited space. More-
over, while the original Panopticon was a speciﬁc ar-
chitectural innovation, its internal logic—as Foucault
himself shows—can be easily transposed between, and
enacted in, different socio-material spaces. When taken
as an abstract ordering principle, Panopticism can thus
equally come to characterize a workplace, a school or
even a “home.” The Panopticon is therefore what in this
article I will call a “socio-spatial conﬁguration,” i.e. an as-
semblage of spatial and social properties and practices
that produce particular subject positions and their inter-
relations. Such an ideal conﬁguration is not only trans-
posable between different contexts, as the term “Panop-
ticism” indicates, but it is also what different systems
theories refer to as “scalable”: as a principle or model, it
can be applied to social systems of any size. In the fol-
lowing, I will argue that such abstract, transposable con-
ﬁgurations are not limited to disciplinary architectures,
but rather, that subject “positions,” ethical or otherwise,
can also and especially be understood as literally con-
structed and enacted through spatial practices.
Admittedly, while discussions of disciplinary archi-
tectures have a long tradition in the social sciences, they
may appear oddly placed in the context of anthropo-
logical discussions of ethics. As anthropologists have
convincingly argued, the study of ethics fundamentally
requires moving beyond the “science of unfreedom”
approach characterizing Foucault’s early work (Laidlaw.019.038 on January 21, 2019 08:00:18 AM
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Steph GROHMANN 5082014), and a Panopticon could therefore be seen as a
space antithetical to ethics—where the majority of indi-
viduals are in a state of being totally controlled by out-
side forces, the emergence of free ethical subjects ap-
pears to be at the very least severely restricted. Indeed,
if ethics ﬁrst and foremost requires self-governance, and
those who are not free to govern themselves, such as slaves
or the “inmates” of a Panopticon, are therefore restricted
in their possibility of becoming occupants of ethical sub-
ject positions, then the “early Foucault” with his empha-
sis on domination would have little to contribute to our
understanding of ethics. However, even before turning
his interest away from domination and toward the free
subject, Foucault was not content to think of disciplinary
structures simply as inescapable sites of total control—
he was careful to note that even in the most repressive
settings, resistance always remains an option. Through
the concept of resistance, even in a Panopticon-like dis-
ciplinary architecture, an element of freedom remains
a possibility—at the same time, however, this potential
must be realized in struggle against the disciplinary ar-
chitecture itself, and the literal and discursive position-
ality it imposes upon body and experience. In the con-
text of disciplinary architectures, one could therefore
say that the possibility of being ethical itself becomes
the focus of a struggle—the possibility of freedom de-
pends on the overcoming of conditions of unfreedom.
Resistance against conditions of unfreedom, if not part
of the “ethical proper,” can therefore be seen at least as
one of its conditions of possibility, and could thus be
called a “proto-ethical” practice.
The Panopticon, while emblematic, is certainly an
extreme example of a spatial order: most spaces humans
inhabit do not, on the face of it, encourage such stark
power differentials. Thinking of architectures of power
not so much in terms of concrete sites, such as a speciﬁc
prison, but rather as transposable and scalable discur-
sive assemblages involving material objects, practices and
subject positions, however, allows us to think of them
not as “things” but rather, as qualities or tendencies which
can characterize speciﬁc socio-material settings to a
greater or lesser degree. At the same time, the fact that
Panopticism is hardly the only way to organize human
inhabitation of space also poses the question of what
other possible conﬁgurations there can be, and what qual-
ities or tendencies they impose on socio-spatial relating.
If architectures of power are inimical to the emergence
of free subjects, then what kind of socio-spatial conﬁgu-
ration would encourage it, and what do people do in or-This content downloaded from 129.215
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms der to resist spatially mediated power in order to create
conditions under which free ethical subjects can ﬂour-
ish? In the following, I want to address this question by
thinking not so much about how people become ethical
subjects, but rather, how they produce the conditions of
possibility for this to be possible: how they manipulate
material and symbolic space in order to allow for free
ethical subjects to potentially emerge, not only in the
context of speciﬁc disciplinary architectures, but rather,
in the context of inhabited space more generally.
The connection between squatting and freedom—
most commonly understood as the absence of political
oppression—has been noted in the small but growing
literature on squatting as a practice. Most commonly,
this literature makes a distinction between squatting in
the global south—mostly in the form of illicit land oc-
cupations—and the kind I am talking about here, namely
the occupation of empty buildings in the cities of the
West. Different squatting scholars have approached the
subject from the perspective of legal and political theory
(Cobb 2012, 2014; Dee 2014; Waring 2014; O’Mahony,
O’Mahony, and Hickey 2014), social policy (Reeve and
Batty 2011; Reeve 2014), the securitisation of the nation
state (Manjikian 2013), and activist networks and social
movements (Squatting Europe Kollective 2013; Cattaneo
and Martínez 2014; Dadusc 2014; Dadusc and Dee 2014;
Kadir 2016; Milligan 2016). Notably, this literature often
makes a distinction between the “vulnerable homeless”
and so-called “lifestyle squatters” (e.g. Prujit 2013; Cat-
taneo and Martínez 2014; critical: Middleton 2014),
a.k.a. “political squatters,” echoing a political discourse
that has fairly consistently attempted to delegitimize
squatting by driving a conceptual wedge between the
“deserving” homeless and “undeserving” political activ-
ists. As some scholars have noted, however, this distinc-
tion is not uncontroversial—in Britain, squatting move-
ments since World War II have consisted of both those
in need of shelter and those committed to political change
(Ward 1976; Reeve 2014). As I expand upon elsewhere
(Grohmann forthcoming), in my ﬁeld site this distinc-
tion did not only not apply, but rather, was actively chal-
lenged by those who saw squatting as a practical solution
to homelessness. Moreover, however, the connection be-
tween squatting and freedom within the community I
studied was not limited to simply the idea of being free
from oppression, although that certainly ﬁgured into it.
Included in the idea of freedom was also the notion that
the act of ordering space, in and of itself, could produce
new and more equal social relations..019.038 on January 21, 2019 08:00:18 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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Squatters were most often organized in small groups
of 3–10 people called “crews” who moved into empty
properties and stayed there until evicted, which, de-
pending on the owner, could take anywhere between
a few days and several years. While until 2012, some
squats enjoyed decades-long quiet due to an absent or
disinterested owner, most crews had to move into a
new space several times a year, necessitating the explicit
or implicit creation of, and adherence to, some kind of
mutually accepted normative framework on how the
newly acquired space should be distributed. Since squat-
ting crews did not necessarily adhere to the kinds of so-
cial relations expected of the inhabitants the houses were
built for—for example, they rarely ﬁt the description of
a nuclear family who would need a master bedroom,
children’s bedrooms and a space to eat together—they
most often had to make up their own rules about how
the space should be used. In concert with the frequent
moves that squatter crews, including the one I was part
of during my ﬁeldwork, were subjected to, meant that
with every new architecture, the rules of inhabitation
had to potentially be re-negotiated. The ﬁrst squat I moved
into when I arrived in the ﬁeld, for example, operated a
form of seniority principle—since the house was larger
than the original crew who had “broken” (i.e. opened)
it, additional people had subsequently moved in one after
another, and it was generally assumed that this temporal
difference translated into a difference in degree of au-
thority. The implicit assumption was that the person
who lived there the longest had the highest investment
in the space, and thus their voice was given more weight
in collective decision making. At least in our crew, this
construction of “authority” was bound up not so much
with a belief in leaders, but rather, with a peculiar under-
standing of being considerate toward the connection of
personal identity and place—the person who lived in
the house the longest was seen to be most strongly en-
tangled with the space, it was his or her “home,” in the
sense of an extension of personhood, more than that
of whoever came later. When this squat was eventually
evicted, we moved into a new building as a group, and
the differences that had structured the crew along tem-
poral lines were wiped out—we were now all “equal”
regarding the duration of our connection with the place,
and each had as much to lose as any. This move was the
ﬁrst of a total of 13 within the space of a year, a number
that, although relatively high, was not unusual for squat-This content downloaded from 129.215
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms ting crews, and each new squat was therefore to an ex-
tent terra nullius as far as entitlement to occupancy was
concerned.
This recurring need to allocate space without caus-
ing social friction (along with the need to house as many
people as possible) was one of the reasons many squats
attempted to devise formal policies to organize social
relations within them (another reason was, as mentioned
above, that while squatters acknowledged that squatting
was, for many, born out of acute material deprivation, it
was also understood as a political practice aimed at cre-
ating social relations based in equality and freedom).
Most squatters subscribed to a more or less theoretically
founded version of anarchist politics, at the core of which
was a belief in radical egalitarianism and communal de-
cision making. While fulﬁlling a need for shelter, many
squats were therefore also intended as social laborato-
ries where such egalitarian relationships could ﬂourish.
By far the most common strategy of achieving this was to
adopt a code of conduct widely known in leftist-activist
circles as a “Safe Space Policy.” These policies set out, of-
ten in writing, that discrimination of any kind on the
basis of gender, race, sexuality, age, disability, and a
number of other identity categories was prohibited. Safe
Space policies (or, acknowledging the impossibility of
a totally safe space, “Safe(r) Space policies”) could often
be found printed out and displayed publicly within a
squat, but where such systems of rules were not explic-
itly displayed, squats within the network usually involved
an expectation that anyone who used the space adhere,
at minimum, to the proscription of “sexism,” “racism,”
and other such forms of discrimination based on identity.
The concept of “Safe Space” has come to a certain
notoriety among academics in recent years, largely owing
to its adoption by various student groups on university
campuses. Campus “Safe Spaces” have come under ﬁre
because, as their critics claim, they have come to be used
as a means to silence political dissent and curb free
speech. The controversy has produced curious alliances
between feminists, conservatives, religious people of dif-
ferent stripes, and self-proclaimed “free-thinkers” who
worry about the suppression of science and reason. Trac-
ing these debates would require a book of its own; how-
ever, it is worth noting that despite the widespread moral
outrage and ridicule campus “Safe Spaces” have recently
attracted, the concept itself is much older and, for most
of its history, was relatively uncontroversial among those
committed to social equality. Vaughan Bell, a neurosci-
entist and psychologist, traces its history to the work of.019.038 on January 21, 2019 08:00:18 AM
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Steph GROHMANN 510psychologist Kurt Lewin, a Jewish refugee from Nazi Ger-
many who went on to become director of the Center
for Group Dynamics at MIT. Lewin—inventor of now
ubiquitous concepts such as “social dynamics” and “feed-
back”—developed a range of self-technologies for cor-
porate managers, including a form of group discussion
called “sensitivity training” (Bell 2015). It was designed
to enable managers to address their own shortcomings
through structured employee feedback, and therefore re-
quired an atmosphere in which concerns and criticism
could be freely expressed to the boss’s face (in the 1940s
not a common occurrence). It was therefore necessary
to establish a set of shared rules that enabled every par-
ticipant to express themselves without fear of later re-
percussions—one could thus say that the ﬁrst “Safe
Space” was created to facilitate speaking truth to power.
It was only during the 1960s that feminist and gay and
lesbian groups adopted the concept to refer to a space
in which normally marginalized standpoints could be
expressed free from political repression, and “Safe Spaces”
did not become ubiquitous on university campuses until
the second decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century.
Squatters on the whole subscribed to the 1960s view
that “Safe Spaces” were not primarily intended as safe-
guards against ideological contamination, but rather,
were designed to prevent forms of violence which were
seen as pervasive in “mainstream society.” BHAM,1 the
largest publicly visible association of squatters in Bris-
tol, state on their ﬂyer: “we operate a safe space policy
at our meetings, this means we do not allow racist, sex-
ist, homophobic or any type of discriminatory behav-
iour.” In this negative formulation, “Safe Space” refers to
a set of behaviors that are forbidden on the basis that
they are seen as common forms of structural oppres-
sion. Another group, running a semi-public social cen-
ter, uses a more positive formulation: its purpose is
“providing a space that is equally welcoming to every-
one (except cops, fascists, etc.) irrespective of age, race,
gender, background, sexuality and (dis)ability.” This
somewhat convoluted wording points to the contradic-
tory nature of “Safe Spaces”; while on the one hand in-
tended for “everyone,” it was also assumed that some
(here, “cops and fascists”) had to be excluded so that
“everyone” could feel welcome. At the same time, while
“everyone” would appear to be as inclusive as one could
be, “Safe Space” policies usually also expressed their sup-1. Bristol Housing Action Movement
This content downloaded from 129.215
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vidually named identity categories. To an extent, this was
due to the fact that some areas of presumed discrimi-
nation were not as clear-cut as others, and “Safe Space”
policies therefore also implicitly communicated a group’s
position of speciﬁc issues. For example, while one group
included “race, gender, sexuality, age, ability, religion” in
its list of supported categories, “religion” was notably ab-
sent in a number of other versions. Within anarchist pol-
itics, religion is often regarded with suspicion, as it is seen
as one form of social domination among many (as the
saying goes: “No Gods, No Masters”), and the fact that
at the same time some people experience discrimination
because of their religious beliefs made this a complex and
often contentious issue.
On the other hand, the listing of individual “modes
of oppression” can be understood as a political statement
that each of the supported groups was recognized in its
particularity, while at the same time, they all were as-
sumed to have something in common—namely the very
fact that they warranted protection through a formal
policy. In the context of squatting, “Safe Space” policies
were thus essentially codiﬁed versions of an anarchist
ethics of mutual aid and protection—the fact that osten-
sibly disparate groups such as gays and lesbians, people
of color, the disabled, and Muslims, were protected un-
der the same policy pointed toward the underlying as-
sumption that what they shared in common was precisely
a vulnerability to the sort of thing the policy protected
them from. As the Bristol Anarchist Federation put it:
“gender, sexuality, age, physical ability, social class, skin
colour and being part of a speciﬁc ethnic group are all
used as excuses for society undertaking and accepting
a catalogue of abuses against people.”2 Inherent in this
view is an understanding of social power that acknowl-
edges particular identity categories not as an essential fea-
ture of the oppressed, but as “excuses” in the eye of the
oppressor. “Safe Spaces”were thus designed not so much
to protect particular identity groups, but rather, as a prac-
tical critique of the binary logic of domination that was
seen to produce them in the ﬁrst place. One could call
it an “intersectional” approach in that it acknowledged
that domination functioned along multiple axes. It re-
mained, however, ﬁrmly situated at the very point of in-
tersection, where all axes of oppression came down to the2. Author anonymous, http://ﬂoaker.net/2013/03/31/organised
-safer-space-2/, accessed 17December 2013.
.019.038 on January 21, 2019 08:00:18 AM
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this sense, anarchist ethics in its purest form—instead
of a formal application of the theories of Stirner or Prou-
dhon, this was, at least in principle, a radical ethics of di-
rect action against any and all forms of institutionalized
social power of people over one another. In contrast
to what is (perhaps unfairly) claimed of campus “Safe
Spaces,” the logic of these spaces was therefore only su-
perﬁcially related to “identity politics,” in the sense of
the partisan interests of speciﬁc groups. Underlying the
acknowledgement of these interests was a peculiar form
of moral universalism, based on a shared vulnerability to
the harmful effects of social power.
In practice, “Safe Space” policies were most often in-
voked in the context of gender relations; more precisely,
in instances of sexual assault. Women were by far the
largest recognized “oppressed” group within the squat-
ting network, while other groups (such as people of color)
were relatively underrepresented. For this reason, as the
anonymous Anarchist Federation writer puts it, “while
[discriminatory] cultural norms can be seen wherever op-
pression takes place . . . the most pervasive and wide-
spread of these affecting all our radical spaces today are
carried over from our dominant culture’s acceptance of
rape and sexual violence.” Preventing such violence—
and where it could not be prevented, at least retrospec-
tively keeping the victim safe from repeatedly having to
face the perpetrator—thus was the most frequent rea-
son “Safe Space” policies were enacted in practice. In
these instances, the moral order implied in “Safe Spaces”
thus most clearly appeared in its speciﬁcally spatial di-
mension—it was assumed that the power the perpetra-
tor held over the victim also and especially consisted in
him3 occupying space that was, for this reason, not ac-
cessible to the victim. The ethical imperative in this situ-
ation was thus to balance the scales by afﬁrming the vic-
tim’s right to occupy space, and removing the threat. In
one instance, the following statement was publicly is-
sued by a number of radical groups:
Following notiﬁcation from [a social center] that X. has
been banned from the centre and its activities due to al-
legations of a serious sexual assault, an emergency meet-
ing of individuals and radical groups in Bristol was held.
As individuals and networks opposed to domination3. Theoretically, this also applied to female perpetrators of
sexual violence and male victims, although in practice, no
such constellation ever occurred within my ﬁeld site.
This content downloaded from 129.215.01
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yny, sexual violence, bullying and intimidation, it was
agreed that X. would be excluded from involvement
with the projects, organisations and groups named be-
low. These groups will also, where they are able, take
steps to exclude him from public events and actions in
which they take part.Squatter’s “Safe Space” policies were thus instruments
for conﬁguring socio-spatial relationships in such a way
that they tended toward more equal power relations. I
say “tended toward” rather than “represented” since
(as the notion of “SafeR Space” acknowledges), it was
accepted that enacting such a policy merely gave mo-
mentum to change, it did not, in and of itself, implement
a new ﬁxed state of being. In producing and maintain-
ing this momentum, however, squatters pursued a clear
agenda: they aimed to address injustice speciﬁcally by
regulating access to, and control over, material and sym-
bolic space across a range of concrete settings. “Safe
Space” in this context was therefore not a term applied
to speciﬁc places as much as it was what I have called
a socio-spatial conﬁguration—a culturally scripted pat-
tern of symbolically andmaterially ordering space, which
could be superimposed upon any number of locales, and
made a speciﬁc place instantly recognizable as a partic-
ular type of space. Moreover, the rationale for imposing
this spatial order was not so different from Foucault’s
discussion of disciplinary architectures: the relations of
oppression characterizing the “mainstream” were seen
to create spaces in which some were exposed to the co-
ercive control of others—women, for example, were
seen to inhabit a space characterized by the threat of a
sexually aggressive male gaze, and consequently had to
monitor their own behavior in the style of a Panopticon
inmate in order to anticipate and avoid this aggression.
This, it was acknowledged, limited and restricted their
spatial and social repertoire, and thus, their freedom.
In so far as “Safe Space” pointed to a speciﬁc spatial con-
ﬁguration, it was therefore set up as a counterbalance to
another conﬁguration which one aimed to overcome—
a spatial order of freedom set against a spatial order of
“oppression.”
One could, of course, accuse these anarchists of sub-
scribing to an outdated, overly binary worldview, which
sorts people into pairs of “oppressors” and “oppressed”
without much concern for nuance. This binary absolut-
ism sits somewhat uncomfortably with the view, more
or less hegemonic in the social sciences today, that power9.038 on January 21, 2019 08:00:18 AM
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exerting power as much as they are subject to it. Surely,
the argument goes, while relations of absolute domina-
tion may still be found in the most repressive of pris-
ons or in the context of “modern slavery,” normal human
affairs are, on the whole, not a matter of brute-force
power of some over others. In concert with the fact that
these squatters were not exotic Others from some re-
mote place far away, but active participants in the same
Western cultural context as the author of this article,
this poses a certain dilemma for the ethnographer: with-
out the option of escaping into notions of radical alter-
ity, what to make of the fact that these people held views
about the way society is organized that ﬂy in the face of
how “we” have learned to think about the very same so-
cial context? It would certainly be an option to simply
assert that they were wrong—that they had fallen prey to
ideological ﬁgures not applicable to the time and place
in which they lived, and that perhaps precisely therein
lay a reason they were excluded from what they called
the “mainstream.” In order to do justice to them, and
take their worldview as seriously as the ethics of ethnog-
raphy demand, I do, however, want to make an alterna-
tive suggestion: that they were not mistaken about how
society works so much as they had access to a dimen-
sion of it that members of the “mainstream” are shel-
tered from precisely due to that status.
In doing so, I hope to also remain faithful to the
Foucauldian tradition in the anthropology of ethics, with-
out, however, using it as a way of diagnosing my respon-
dents with holding an “incorrect” idea of power. Rather,
I want to retrace the great philosopher’s own steps back-
wards to where he was coming from before turning his
attention to freedom: as many commentators have noted,
Foucault did not disavow his theory of domination in
favor of a theory of the self-governing subject so much
as he underwent a shift in emphasis (see Rabinow 1986).
At no point, however, did he revise his earlier idea that
disciplinary relations of domination can and do charac-
terize certain human relations, and it is thus interesting
to ask whether and how we could think of them not
as a sphere separate from and unrelated to the ethical,
but rather, as underlying and complementing it, while
at the same time forming its conceptual antithesis. “Sub-
ethical” relations of domination would then not appear
as irrelevant to the study of ethics, but rather, as one of
its central problems—where domination rules and free-
dom is restricted, so is the emergence of ethical relations;
and the overcoming of domination is then a necessaryThis content downloaded from 129.215
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if not an ethical practice as such, is thus at the very least
“proto-ethical” in that it aims to even the social playing
ﬁeld in such a way that moving into ethical subject po-
sitions proper becomes an option for those who previ-
ously were restricted from it.
This view appears to sit well with how squatters saw
the world: they too acknowledged that within social
space, relations of domination exist between certain sub-
ject positions (speciﬁed in terms of gender, “race,” etc.)
and at the same time, that the ideal space would be one
where these relations have been overcome and all sub-
jects have the opportunity to become self-governing and
free. Pointedly speaking, they saw the world as a prison,
and their resistance (a term that they readily embraced)
as aimed against the disciplinary nature of a society in
which they saw themselves very much as inmates. Like
a resisting prisoner, they aimed to remove themselves
as far as possible from the control of this disciplinary
apparatus and its totalitarian eye, by creating spaces in
which its proponents had no place (“no cops, no fas-
cists”). Their alternative vision was an ideal of a “good
space” in which the deadlock of oppressive pairs of sub-
ject positions was broken, and people could therefore
relate as free subjects. One could therefore say that an-
archist practice in this context formed an angle or turn-
ing point between the “older” and the “newer” Foucault—
where the philosopher merely shifted his focus, squatters
were busy shifting reality from its present state as a prison
to a desired state as an association of free ethical beings.
But what are we to make of the anarchist claim that
society is characterized by relations of brute-force, spa-
tially mediated domination that requires remedial pol-
icy? Panopticism, while helpful to explain how subject
positions are spatially produced, also has its limits in
thinking about what the concrete space of unfreedom
squatters tried to overcome looked like. Even the most
pessimistic political theory of “mainstream society” as
a disciplinary apparatus cannot seriously claim that, on
the whole, it ﬁxes people in space and subjects them to
total and inescapable control (and not even the most
ardent anarchist claimed such a thing). Similarly, while
“the state” was a natural staple of anarchist critique, the
relations of domination that “Safe Space” policies were
designed to address were by no means limited to resis-
tance against the state and its organs such as the police,
although these were certainly part of it. On the whole,
the power that anarchists aimed to address was not sit-
uated solely in disciplinary structures or “institutions.019.038 on January 21, 2019 08:00:18 AM
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these terms. Rather, it was to be found in immediate
spatial relations of bodies among each other, such as
when one violent individual, most likely without any
institutional power whatsoever, could single-handedly
block access to a particular space for others through his
mere presence. Power here was very much ﬂowing be-
tween individuals, but at the same time, it did so by
virtue of them being assigned to particular groups or
subject positions (unjustly so, if anarchists were to be be-
lieved). So how can we frame this relationship between
political categories and individual embodiment to un-
derstand how squatters arrived at their binary view of
power?
In the second part of this article, I would like to dis-
cuss this question, drawing on the work of an anthro-
pologist who is more readily associated with the cogni-
tive side of the discipline: Maurice Bloch. In his 2008
article “Why religion is nothing special but is central,”
Bloch discusses the difference between human and non-
human primates by suggesting a distinction between
two different but interrelated spheres of the social. One,
which he calls the “transcendental social” “consists of
essentialised roles or groups” (2008: 2056), comparable
to the notion of “imagined communities.” This sphere,
Bloch argues, is exclusive to homo sapiens, and makes
it possible to assign individuals to abstract social posi-
tions that exist separately from the individuals them-
selves. This notion shows some parallels to the idea of
“subject positions” as transcendental symbolic loci, which,
too, exist independently of the speciﬁc individuals oc-
cupying them. Next to this, Bloch argues, there exists
a sphere he calls the “transactional social,” which con-
sists in immediate, embodied relations between indi-
viduals, based on power differentials (2008). This level,
according to Bloch, is shared between humans and other
primates, and essentially comes down to the direct en-
actment of dominance hierarchies. The term “subject
position” here only applies in the most unsophisticated
(and certainly un-Foucauldian) of senses: that of an in-
dividual with a ﬁrst-person perspective being positioned
in space relative to another. It was precisely this imme-
diacy, however, that the anarchist approach to spatial
justice addressed: while justifying its interventions into
the nature of relationships between groups who were de-
ﬁned in terms of the “transcendental social,” the practical
application of “Safe Space” rules most often came down
to physically regulating access to space, and thus played
out very much in terms of transactional relations.This content downloaded from 129.215
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illuminate a peculiar feature of the spatial construction
of subject positions; in the context of spatial relations,
the interaction between the transcendental and the trans-
actional social is very much a two-way road. On the one
hand, it is not difﬁcult to see how access to space is reg-
ulated according to transcendental assignments: a per-
son’s belonging to a particular group also means that
they are assigned the spatial entitlement associated with
this group. Squatters recognized this in assuming that
particular persons, by virtue of being “women,” “mi-
grants,” “queers,” etc., were subject to a contested claim
to space, which consequently had to be defended. At
the same time, however, the reverse also applies: tran-
scendental subject positions are constructed, to a cer-
tain extent, according to the de facto position of bodies
in space relative to one another. The seniority principle I
encountered in my ﬁrst squat, for example, constructed
transcendental authority according to the length of time
a speciﬁc body had dwelled within a speciﬁc building
relative to the others. In terms of spatiality, therefore,
the transactional and transcendental spheres of human
relating can be seen to be mutually co-constitutive: tran-
scendental assignments follow de facto control over space
as much as control over space is granted according to
transcendental assignments. In order to understand the
binary view of power which squatters held, it is there-
fore helpful to start not from the way they constructed
binary relations between transcendental subject posi-
tions, but rather, from the other end: the way that these
subject positions themselves were constructed accord-
ing to the degree of transactional spatial power they im-
plied. What this means becomes clearer when we re-
place “transactional spatial power” with a more familiar
term: human territoriality.
Beyond territoriality
“Territory” is most often considered a “juridico-political”
(Foucault 1976) concept, associated with theories of the
state and of political and military power. In its most ba-
sic sense, however, territoriality can be taken to mean
simply “the attempt by an individual or group to affect,
inﬂuence, or control people, phenomena and relation-
ships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geo-
graphic area . . . this delimitation becomes a territory
only when its boundaries are used to affect behaviour
by controlling access” (Sack 1986: 19). What distin-
guishes the notion of territory from that of mere space.019.038 on January 21, 2019 08:00:18 AM
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ing, which involves the interruption of the continuity
of space in the shape of a strict demarcation of inside
and outside, and the subdivision and ordering of the
inside. On the other hand, “territory” is an active so-
cial form—its maintenance involves effort in the exer-
cise of control over boundaries and internal structure,
as territory is always potentially contested. Most im-
portantly, as implied in Sack’s deﬁnition, “territory” is
space delimited for a particular purpose: that of exer-
cising control over others. Territory thus implies social
power, not in the egalitarian sense of Foucault’s power
relations between free subjects, but quite in the binary
sense that squatters understood “oppression.” The sub-
ject positions it produces are, on the one hand, “insid-
ers” and “outsiders” and, on the other hand, those who
control the territory and those who are being controlled.
Territory, understood as a socio-spatial conﬁguration, is
thus based on a dual logic of internment and exclusion:
in so far as it produces outsiders, it excludes, in so far as
it establishes internal hierarchy, it interns the “insiders”
under the control of the territorial actor. As a mecha-
nism to distribute spatial entitlement, territory thus works
to concentrate this entitlement in the hands of those who
control both access as well as internal power relations.
As Sack argues, territorial behavior can be designed
to beneﬁt those controlled (e.g. a parent limiting the
spatial range of a child to keep it safe), or to harm them.
But whether benign or malevolent, by turning on the
factor of control over access, territoriality crucially in-
volves the production of space as a scarce resource, and
thus has the potential to engender competition between
territorial actors. In non-human animals, this is fairly
uncontroversial—rank in many species is crucially ne-
gotiated through controlling access to space. In chim-
panzees, for example, dominant individuals not only
pick the most favorable feeding and resting spots (and
hold on to them), they also control the spatial position
of subordinates through body language, vocalization, and,
where territorial claims are challenged, physical aggres-
sion, thus banishing lower-ranking animals to the social
and spatial periphery of the group (Murray, Mane, and
Pusey 2007). But territorial control not only means lim-
iting access to speciﬁc places—it also means controlling
other’s ways of traversing space. Where a dominant in-
dividual’s chosen trajectory from A to B intersects with
that of a subordinate, the dominant will claim his right
to keep moving in a straight line, while it falls upon the
subordinate to negotiate a detour in order to avoid aThis content downloaded from 129.215
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therefore, the more an animal must adapt the position
of his body in space relative to that of more powerful
individuals, which also involves anticipating their fu-
ture movements to plan his own. Dominant animals thus
function somewhat like black holes of social power—
their very presence warps and bends the spatial and tem-
poral trajectories of subordinates, like centers of gravity
in the fabric of social space-time.
Human primates, as anthropologists are well aware,
are in contrast entangled in complex symbolic systems
which appear to have removed them far from the phys-
ically enacted dominance hierarchies of other species.
It would certainly be mistaken to reduce human terri-
toriality to mere animal instinct, or to imply that un-
derneath the cultural “ﬂuff,” we are just apes jockeying
for rank. However, as Bloch’s transactional/transcen-
dental model implies, our capacity to produce “culture”
as a transcendental system of meaning does not mean
that we have entirely left these forms of interaction be-
hind (Bloch 2008). Following Bloch, in humans, the rem-
nants of dominance hierarchies therefore co-exist with
enduring cultural “superstructures,” and there is no a
priori reason to assume that one takes precedence over
the other. There is equally no reason to assume that
these domains should be entirely separate, and that re-
curring patterns of dominance and subordination would
therefore not also ﬁnd expression on a symbolic level, or
conversely, that symbolic power relations would not also
impact the relationship between individual bodies. This
is especially true when it comes to the ordering of space
according to status—it is, for example, widely accepted
among homo sapiens that the highest-ranking individ-
ual in any social context should be assigned the most fa-
vorable sitting spot. A human towering over others on a
throne, or in the executive chair at the head of the board-
room table, afﬁrms social status as effectively as any
chimpanzee’s insistence on occupying the tallest rock
around.
Human ways of negotiating such spatial assignments
among themselves are, at a basic bodily level, equally
similar to those of non-human animals—eye contact
oftentimes establishes whether or not a claim to control
over space will be made or contested (think two drivers
gauging each other’s willingness to give way at a cross-
ing), and where it is, bodily posturing and vocalization
(“get out of my way”) are used to pull rank. If one went
out in Bristol city center on a Friday or Saturday night,
one could thus observe a ritual which can be found in.019.038 on January 21, 2019 08:00:18 AM
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the inﬂuence of copious amounts of alcohol, were wan-
dering around looking for a physical confrontation. One
very effective strategy of ﬁnding it consisted in picking a
potential opponent, walking into his path, and then to just
keep walking as if his body was not there, so that one
bumped into him. This ritual had the function of estab-
lishing rank by challenging the opponent’s spatial posi-
tion, and to drive home the message that he better watch
where hewas putting his body since amore dominantmale
was demanding right of way. As with all self-respecting
primates, the gesture was reliably understood as a chal-
lenge, and if it was accepted, the combatants would keep
pounding at each other until the police arrived.
These territorial displays on a bodily level are not co-
incidentally also rituals of masculinity on a symbolic level,
and they therefore illustrate how bodies are assigned to
the transcendental category “gender” in terms of trans-
actional territoriality. In so far as territoriality establishes
rank, and men, on the whole, socially rank higher than
women, cultural ideas of masculinity have often involved
elements of territorial dominance. The ritual of “walking
into” another man also worked as an insult because it
rested on the assumption that a “real man” should be
capable of defending his turf, ﬁrst and foremost that of
his own body. As Brace (1997: 144) notes, masculinity is
inherently bound up with the idea of sovereign control
over the territory of the body, and male anxiety about
boundary loss and invasion therefore ﬁnds its expression
in homophobic fears of potential penetration. Women,
on the other hand, were traditionally seen not so much
as territorial actors as they were seen as territories—their
bodies are constructed as uninhabited spaces, hollow and
quite literally full of holes, and thus ﬁt to be penetrated,
invaded, and colonized. While men occupy space, women
thus are occupied, and, quite frequently, they have to de-
fend their inhabitation of their bodies against the “rights”
of other residents, such as unborn fetuses. Bloch’s some-
what cavalier assertion that “we” go “in and out of each
other’s bodies . . . like in birth and sex” (2013) therefore
only tells half the truth—it is women’s bodies that are
here frequented like hotels, and it is precisely this pre-
sumed permeability and hollowness, that makes a body
feminized.44. Gay males, then, are demeaned because of the suspicion
that the boundaries of their bodies might be equally per-
meable, putting them closer to women than to ‘real men,’
and thus assigning them a lower social status.
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in, and trajectory through, space in myriads of differ-
ent ways, and their culturally scripted way of spatial re-
lating is designed to not only establish, but reinforce
dominance hierarchies. This concerns, for example, the
traditional ﬁxation of female bodies within the space of
the “home,” but also the gendering of bodies through
their positioning in public spaces. Many of the forms of
“everyday sexism” that have become the subject of public
debate in recent years affect women’s spatial existence—
the neologism “manspreading,” for example, refers to the
phenomenon of men routinely taking up more space on
public transport than their bodies require, thus limiting
women’s access to seats. Another neologism, “manslam-
ming,” has been coined to describe the observation that,
once women deliberately stop moving out of men’s way
in public, inevitable collisions ensue—just as the domi-
nant individuals among other primates expect to move
from A to B in a straight line, so too do human men,
and women must therefore adjust their trajectory or
“slam” into them. Finally, ubiquitous forms of gendered
violence such as street harassment and the ever-present
threat of sexual assault mean that women must plan their
movement through space according to the presence of
potentially dangerous male bodies—men thus become
“centres of social gravity” warping women’s experience
of space and time, not so much because “space is gen-
dered” as has often been said (e.g. Massey 2013), but be-
cause gender, as a social hierarchy, is also and especially
spatially produced.
Gendered identities can therefore be said to be spa-
tially constructed in a double sense—in the sense of
gendered bodies being constructed as particular kinds
of spaces, and in the sense of the kind of position and
trajectory assigned to them within larger spatial conﬁg-
urations. At the same time, gender illustrates the mu-
tual co-constitution of transactional and transcendental
relations: belonging to the transcendental category “men”
entails certain spatial entitlements, but conversely, pos-
sessing spatial entitlement is also what makes one a
“man.” What goes for gender equally goes for “race.”
Although, ideologically speaking, “race” is a very dif-
ferent ﬁgure, a central element of racializing bodies is
not only to spatially segregate them from the dominant
group, but to simultaneously assign them a less desir-
able (and thus subordinate) spatial position, be it at the
back of the bus or in the “ghetto.” In gendering and
racializing bodies, physically enacted dominance hierar-
chies therefore coincide with cultural narratives of un-.019.038 on January 21, 2019 08:00:18 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Steph GROHMANN 516equal symbolic value, and both work to reinforce one
another. Gender and “race” as particular instances of
transcendental categories here point to an underlying
principle—our cultural forms are never wholly divorced
from our existence as embodied animals, also and es-
pecially when it comes to the fundamental need of hu-
mans to be able to occupy space. Space is thus intimately
connected to power precisely because, in controlling ac-
cess, territorial actors also control a resource essential to
physical survival.
Granted, in Western nations most of us—certainly
most anthropologists—are far removed fromsurvival con-
cerns when it comes to their occupancy of space. How-
ever, one only has to walk the streets of almost any West-
ern city to ﬁnd out what happens to those for whom the
transcendental layer of culture recedes and leaves the
body physically and symbolically exposed: we usually
refer to them as “homeless.” As Tanya Luhrmann (2006,
2007, 2008) observes, street-homeless people (fromwhom
squatters were only one step removed by virtue of their
very squatting), in the widespread absence of protection
through the state, often adopt a certain aggressive style
of interaction in order to protect themselves from as-
sault. Luhrmann compares this to “the ‘code of honour’
commonly found among nomadic peoples, pastoralists
and ranchers . . . (who), because they are isolated . . .
have few others to help to defend them. In such poorly
policed settings, physical survival may depend upon an
ability to defend one’s turf so aggressively . . . that the
trouble slinks away” (2008: 17). Crucially, this behavior
is necessitated in large part by the absence of transcen-
dental social institutions designed to intervene on behalf
of the attacked, such as the state, the police, or the legal
system, be it because such institutions do not exist, as for
the pastoralist, or because individuals have no access to
them, as for the homeless. In Bloch’s terms, the homeless
therefore have lost access to the level of the transcen-
dental social, and are reduced to enacting transactional
dominance hierarchies in much the same way as other
primates.5
The notion of territoriality can therefore here illu-
minate two things: one is that, while on the level of the
transcendental, power relations between subject posi-5. I am not aware that Bloch has speciﬁcally addressed
homelessness in this context in his writing. I do, however,
recall attending a talk by him at the LSE in 2014 where he
explicitly made this point.
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pologists, are used to framing them, on the level of the
transactional they are, in fact, very much binary: in the
context of dominance hierarchies, one can be the top-
ape or the bottom-ape but not much in between. On
the other hand, as Luhrmann’s example shows, there
are situations even in the midst of our “advanced” West-
ern societies, where transcendental assignments are de
facto stripped away and people are reduced to “bare
territoriality”: homelessness as a phenomenon epito-
mizes this state. Given that squatters, their utopian ideas
notwithstanding, saw their practices also very much as a
reaction to the desperate absence of shelter, it is there-
fore not difﬁcult to understand how they would arrive
at an idea of power in line with the binary nature of ter-
ritorial dominance hierarchies—they were, in fact, the
very people whose political and economic position re-
duced them to the necessity of defending their physi-
cal “turf ” against territorial aggression. Moreover, while
their political analysis took into account both levels—
the transactional and the transcendental—their practice
addressed the problem “bottom up”: “Safe Space” pol-
icies, while framed in terms of transcendental groups,
effectively regulated territorial relations between concrete
bodies.
In a sense, “Safe Space” practices thus replaced the
absent (and in any case, undesired) protection of the
state with an “alternative transcendental”—an imagined
community based on a moral notion of solidarity in the
light of shared vulnerability to territorial exposure. In en-
forcing rules that essentially prohibited the establish-
ment of physical or symbolic dominance hierarchies (not
always successfully, but qua intention), it thus pre-empted
the necessity for individuals to assert themselves against
territorial challenge. In this sense, “Safe Space” policies
paradoxically had the effect of turning squats into some-
thing like diminutive versions of the territorial state: they
bundled individual territorial claims into a collective ven-
ture, and thus channeled aggressive energy away from
competition on the inside, and into the defense against
the outside. The state, of course, consists of a multitude
of complex layers of social relations, of which the basic
logic of territoriality is just one, in so far as it involves
a collective form of territorial practice. However, one
of its central legitimizing claims is that it serves as the
idealized expression of the collective territorial inter-
ests of its citizens. In the same way as it ensures indi-
vidual claims to property, it also works to assure indi-
vidual entitlements to space through mutual contractual.019.038 on January 21, 2019 08:00:18 AM
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must take part in defending the outer boundary. Seen
from the outside, such states can thus commonly be
observed to behave much like territorial individuals, de-
fending their turf through aggressive posturing while
on the inside, a more or less functional ordering regime
ensures that every body is in its proper place. In the part-
incidental, part-intentional absence of the state, squat-
ters therefore began to do the same. The difference lay
mostly in the nature of the internal ordering mecha-
nism: whereas squats actively worked to undermine the
emergence of internal hierarchies, the state most often
does the opposite.
The construction of “Safe Spaces” can thus, once again,
be seen as a “transformational device” between two dis-
tinct but interrelated states of being: just as it serves as
a mediator between a Foucauldian state of domination
and free subject relations, so too does it work to trans-
form Bloch’s binary dominance hierarchies into tran-
scendental human relations, in the absence of the sym-
bolic ordering mechanism of the state. Granted, ﬂeshing
out the continuities and differences between Foucault’s
and Bloch’s models would require careful theorization
that is beyond the scope of this paper. We can, however,
observe some obvious commonalities between them:
both models imply that human relations can reﬂect an
extreme of absolute, embodied and enacted power differ-
entials, as well as an opposite pole of free human relating,
in which the Foucauldian may recognize the sphere of
the ethical, and the “Blochian” the realm of the genu-
inely human. Combining these views, one could therefore
speak of two spheres of spatial relating: a “transactional-
territorial” sphere, and a “transcendental-ethical” one. In
the context of spatiality, these two realms may again be
recognizable as what I have called socio-spatial conﬁgu-
rations: assemblages of material objects (including the
body), practices and beliefs that produce speciﬁc socio-
spatial positions and the type of relationship between
them. As we have seen, these conﬁgurations are trans-
posable and scalable—just as the logic of territorial be-
havior may apply to a pastoralist’s small ﬁeld as much as
to a nation state, so too can a “Safe Space” be declared—
in theory—on a space of any size. At the same time,
these two spatial orders produce fundamentally differ-
ent types of social power—where territoriality always
tends toward domination, an egalitarian spatial order,
such as implied in “Safe Space” approaches, implies the
opposite, namely a tendency toward freedom. The de-
liberate invocation of a “Safe Space” conﬁguration wasThis content downloaded from 129.215
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a speciﬁc, acutely threatened social group, but also be-
cause, in the aforementioned moral universalism of an-
archist ethics, it was designed to counterbalance (spatial)
inequality as such. For each instance of a “Safe Space,”
it therefore had to be determined who, at present, was
at the receiving end of territorial subjugation—and in
the heat of everyday resistance, that could, occasionally,
become quite a complex question.
To illustrate this with a ﬁnal example: In “my” ﬁrst
squat, our crew had shared the house with a man, I will
here call him Tariq, who was reluctant to share more
about his background than that he had come fromNorth
Africa and had no intention to return there. It was gen-
erally assumed that he was a so-called “illegal” (i.e. un-
documented migrant), but nobody cared enough about
immigration law to investigate the matter. Tariq even-
tually drifted away and was not seen for several weeks,
but as soon as we had moved into our new squat, he
turned up at our door one evening and asked to be al-
lowed to move in. Since the squat was spacious enough,
he was admitted, but it soon emerged that he had since
developed a cocaine habit, and the drug caused him
(or gave him license to) systematically mistreat those
around him. To the particular chagrin of the female
squatters, he appeared to have decided that it was wom-
en’s role to keep the house clean, cook for him, and gen-
erally wait on his whim, which he noisily and aggres-
sively demanded. This situation persisted for a few weeks,
until one day Tariq crossed the line with a female squat-
ter by transgressing on the space of her body without
consent, and a “Safe Space” was ofﬁcially invoked. Tariq
was summoned to a house meeting (a full assembly, re-
ﬂecting the gravity of the situation), confronted with
his behavior, and, since no promise of betterment was
forthcoming, asked to remove himself from the squat
while being offered an alternative place to sleep. He did
not take well to this, in his view, unjust and despotic de-
cision, stomped back to his room in a ﬂurry of anger,
locking himself in, and as the afternoon progressed,
drank himself into a rage and periodically stepped out-
side his door to shout abuse at everyone present. As it
had become fairly obvious that he would not leave vol-
untarily, squatters from nearby houses were summoned
to assist with the eviction.
Around nightfall, the situation had escalated to such
an extent that Tariq was angrily pacing up and down
the corridor, brandishing an axe and threatening to kill
anyone who dared come near him. At the other end of.019.038 on January 21, 2019 08:00:18 AM
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with assorted blunt objects huddled in a corner, trying
to summon the courage to disarm him. Once in a while,
one of the group would venture across the yard to try
and talk sense into Tariq, only to come back unharmed
but without result. The standoff lasted until, ﬁnally, one
of our crew, more sensitive to the threat of violence than
others, lost his nerve and phoned for the police. As he
announced their imminent arrival, a shower of abuse
rained upon him from both sides of the battleﬁeld. “You
f****** idiot” someone shouted, “Tariq is illegal!” In an
instant, the weapons vanished on both sides, and when
the police rang the doorbell a few minutes later, they en-
countered a scene of blissful tranquility, as squatters sat
around a table drinking tea. The police in general had no
particular interest in squatters’ internal conﬂicts, and so
just grumbled something about wasting their time and
climbed back into their vehicle. During their short ap-
pearance, someone had thankfully hidden Tariq’s axe
out of sight, and thus disarmed, he realized his battle was
lost. Presumably both placated and intimidated by his
narrow escape from the law, he packed his things and
was eventually assisted in carrying his belongings to a
friend’s house nearby.
This incident illustrates how our two spatial conﬁgura-
tions—the transactional-territorial and the transcendental-
ethical—can overlay each other in a single physical space,
and how actors can quickly change register from the
enactment of a “Safe Space” to that of a “territory” and
back again. The ﬁrst to emerge as a territorial actor was
Tariq—his attempts to control those inside the space of
the squat, so they would comply with his demands, co-
incided with his bid to exert control over the spaces of
women’s bodies. This resulted in the invocation of a
“Safe Space” and the moral order implied in it: in order
to counterbalance this display of territorial dominance,
and to protect those who were most spatially vulnerable
(in this case the women), the person who behaved in
a territorial way had to be removed. This territorial con-
ﬂict was interrupted by the arrival of a more powerful
territorial actor, namely the state, in the shape of the po-
lice. Spontaneously and without much debate, the squat
therefore reverted to “Safe Space” mode, and sided with
the one who, in this conﬁguration, was the most spatially
vulnerable, only this time it was Tariq who was in need
of protection vis-à-vis the state. Finally, once the police
were gone, the squat effortlessly switched registers once
again, to re-establish the original “Safe Space” and re-
move Tariq to protect the women. In this interaction,This content downloaded from 129.215
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms the logic of “Safe Space” and the logic of territory thus
came into direct conﬂict, as both patterns were alternately
imposed on the space of the squat in short order. De-
pending on which paradigm dominated, individual actors
such as Tariq thus occupied different and contradictory
subject positions: from a territorial aggressor threaten-
ing others’ spatial entitlement, he transformed into the
spatially vulnerable party in need of protection, and back
again. At the same time, these pattern switches involved
jumps in scale—depending on how the relevant space
was deﬁned, the pattern was scaled up to include the ter-
ritory of the state, or down to include only the inside of
the squat. Moreover, the enactment of the pattern was
strangely hybrid: in order to establish the moral order
of a “Safe Space,” squatters had to paradoxically act in a
territorial fashion. This paradox reﬂects the same con-
tradiction that plagued squats more generally: despite
their egalitarian and open principles, they were still sur-
rounded by a hostile outside which made defense a de
facto necessity, and they were thus always suspended in
a precarious balance between the two types of symbolic
order.
Conclusion
I began this paper with the Panopticon as a well-known
example of how subjectivities are also and especially spa-
tially produced. As the Foucauldian distinction between
“domination” and “power” implies, this does not mean
that these subjectivities are necessarily synonymous with
what anthropologists of ethics, such as Faubion, have re-
ferred to as “ethically marked subject positions.” Rather,
whether or not such distinctly ethical subject positions
can emerge is very much a question of what type of spa-
tial conﬁguration one is dealing with. In trying to tease
out what this approach can contribute to the anthropo-
logical study of ethics, I have suggested looking at prac-
tices, exempliﬁed in the “Safe Space” policies used by
squatters. These are designed to inhibit the emergence
of a particular kind of spatial order—which, following
Bloch, I have called a transactional-territorial order—and
facilitate the emergence of another, which I have called
“transcendental-ethical,” and which, according to Bloch,
separates human from non-human primates. As the Pa-
nopticon itself shows, most of the spaces humans inhabit
are not examples of one or the other of these conﬁgura-
tions in their pure form—they are blends, or more pre-
cisely, they show inherent tendencies toward one as much
as the other. To which side they fall, in any given moment,.019.038 on January 21, 2019 08:00:18 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
519 MAKING SPACE FOR FREE SUBJECTSis very much a matter of the extent to which actors enforce
one or the other tendency on a space. Even a Panopticon,
with its distinct tendency toward relations of domina-
tion, can be “ﬂipped” to become a space in which free
ethical subjects can potentially ﬂourish by enhancing the
degree of freedom and self-governance available to its
inhabitants. This involves an agreement by all partici-
pants to resist the emergence of dominance hierarchies
and to co-operate in balancing the distribution of social
power; in other words, solidarity. In referring to abstract
identity categories (essentialized roles), squatters thus
established who this solidarity should apply to (namely
those assumed to be the weakest territorial actor). Their
practice, however, addressed this problem by radically
distributing control over material space, and thus over-
throwing the transactional order.
What I have aimed to demonstrate is thus that if we
take seriously the notion of freedom as a precondition
for ethics, then we must also ask how people go about
producing this freedom in the ﬁrst place. Self-governance
is not always self-evident; it has to be socially produced,
or in many cases, fought for. For want of a better term,
I have therefore called such practices “proto-ethical”—
they may not ﬁt the bill for notions such as the “auto-
poietic subject,” or the deliberate assuming of speciﬁcally
ethical subject positions. By creating the conditions that
are required for actors to engage in such things, how-
ever, they create spaces in which ethical life becomes a
possibility, and they aim to expand this possibility to as
many people as possible. This involves creating a sym-
bolic space in which speciﬁc essentialized roles are not as
important as the quality of the relations between them—
the logic of “Safe Spaces” implied, after all, that what
identity category one ﬁlls is secondary, as long as one
was territorially disadvantaged. Finally, speaking with
Bloch, homo sapiens could thus also be seen to be the
only species involved in actively undermining its own in-
herent dominance hierarchies—which would make an-
archism a uniquely human phenomenon indeed.References
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